Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships
David E. M. Sappington I f volt ii'cint son~rthingr l o~rright, ilo it jour\rlf.
'l'his age-old maxim has sotiie o f t h e mqjor concerns of rriode~~ri "incentive theory" at its heart. Incentive theory, ho~vever, generally t0cuses on tasks th,~t are too complicated or too costl:. to d o oneself. -1'hus. the "principal" is obliged to hire ;in "agent" with specialized skills or kno\\.ledge to perform the task in cluestion. T h e central concern is how tile principal ciiri best niotivate tlte agent to perfor111 as the principal ~vonlct prefer, takirig into iiccount the clifliculties in tnonitoring the agent's activities.
T h e intent of this :i~-ticle is to identify some of the m;!jor issues that have t~e e n examined i r l the 1iteratul.e on iticetitives. T h e article begitis by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems. Nest, the principal's opti~nal response to these frictions is explored, taking as given the characteristics of the agents rvith wllonl the p~.iricipal interacts in a nonl-epeated setting.
-PIie design of in&\-idualized contlxcts, contests and tourrlanlents is analyzed. .i'hcrl, the principal's task of selecting the best agerit is addressect, and repeated agenc-y relationships are corisictered. Sorile surnInar)-comments are offered i t 1 conclusion. L'ntil the concluding section. the discussion will focus on simple agcric)-relationships that procecci in isolation fi-om other agency relationships. '1-his t0cus fi~cilitates the cleat.est identification of the ke!-incentive problems th;it ;ir.ise both in the sirnplest of agency relationships and in rnore coniplex organi~atiorls like co~.po~.atiotis governments. ' ; i~~d
Before proceeding, briefly consider the myriad of applications of the principal-agent paradigm. In a labor setting, a boss or employer may serve the role of principal, while a subordinate or worker may act as agent. In regulated industries, the regulator might act as principal, designing an incentive scheme for the firm (agent) whose activities are being regulated.' A military leader might similarly strive to influence the activities of the troops under his command. Alternatively, the dean of a college might create incentives to motivate a faculty. The classic example of the principal-agent relationship has a landlord overseeing the activities of a tenant farmer.
A Canonical Setting
Under certain circumstances, it may be possible for a principal to induce agents to behave exactly as the principal would if the principal shared the agents' skills and knowledge. By describing these circumstances, it becomes possible to pinpoint the sources of friction between principal and agent that typically preclude this ideal arrangement.
T o begin, consider a relatively simple setting. Suppose there is only one principal, a landlord for example, and one agent, a tenant farmer. Both parties are risk neutral. Initially, the landlord and tenant farmer share the same beliefs about a critical random productivity parameter, 8, such as the amount of rainfall. Higher realizations of the productivity parameter, 8, like increased effort, e, on the agent's part, both increase the agent's expected performance. Realized performance, X, might be the amount of crop the farmer ultimately harvest^.^ For simplicity, suppose the agent can observe 8 before choosing how much effort to exert.4 However, the principal can't observe either the realization of 8 or the level of effort exerted by the agent. The principal's valuation of performance level X is denoted V(X), which is an increasing function of X with he interested reader is strongly encouraged to read the insightful review by Holmstrom and Tirole (1988) . Their analysis of incentive issues in the firm provides a detailed critique of a variety of topics that are afforded only cursory treatment here. For related overviews, see Hart and Holmstrom (1987) and Laffont and Maskin (1982). or surveys that address this particular interpretation of the principal-agent paradigm, see Baron (1988) , Besanko and Sappington (1987) , Caillaud, Guesnerie, Rey and Tirole (1988) , and Sappington and . 3~o r example, if X = e0, then performance is proportional to the farmer's effort and to the amount of rainfall. If performance did not vary with 0 , the magnitude of the agent's effort could be inferred erfectly from X , making the incentive problem a trivial one. 'The relationship between X and both e and 0 could be deterministic, as illustrated in the preceding footnote, or it could be stochastic. This latter possibility could be captured as follows. Let f ( X I e , 0 ) denote the density function for performance, X, when the productivity parameter is 0 and the agent exerts effort level e. F(X I e, 0 ) is the associated cumulative distribution function.
Higher levels of effort and higher realizations of 0 decrease the probability that the smaller levels of performance will be realized, i.e., F,(X I e , 0 ) j 0 and Fo(X I e, 0 ) 5 0. The expected marginal impact of the agent's effort is also assumed to be greater in more productive environments, that is F,&X I e, 0 ) 5 0.
David E. M . Sappington 4 7 diminishing returns. For instance, V ( X )might represent the income the principal can secure by selling the delivered crop.
The timing of the interaction between principal and agent in this simplest of settings is the following. First, the principal designs the terms of the contract, which specifies the payments P the agent will receive depending on observed performance X. The principal then offers the contract to the agent. Next, the agent decides whether to accept or reject the contract. If the agent rejects the contract, the relationship is terminated, never to occur again. If the agent accepts the contract, he begins his "employment" and observes the realization of the productivity parameter, 8. Next, the agent decides how much effort to put forth. Finally, the agent's performance is observed, and payments are made to the agent, as promised in the contract.
The principal is endowed with all of the bargaining power in this simple setting, and thus can make a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer to the agent. The agent will accept the contract offered by the principal if and only if subsequent self-interested behavior under the terms of the contract provides the agent with a level of expected utility that exceeds his reservation level, U. This reservation level is presumed known to both the principal and the agent.
In this setting, the ideal outcome for the principal has two elements. First, for each realization of 8, the agent chooses the efficient level of effort, e*(8). This level of effort maximizes the expected surplus, defined a s~h e difference between the expected value of the agent's performance and the agent's cost of effort, including his opportunity cost 0.Second, the principal collects the entire surplus, always leaving the agent with exactly his reservation utility level.
In this simple canonical problem, the principal can ensure this most preferred arrangement with a simple contract. This contract promises payments, P , to the agent that are precisely the principal's valuation of the agent's performance less some fixed constant k. Formally, P ( X ) = V ( X )-k . The constant k in this contract can be interpreted as a "franchise fee" paid by the agent for the right to work for the principal. This franchise fee is set equal to the expected total surplus from efficient ~p e r a t i o n .~ Here, the principal resolves the problem of motivating the agent by making the agent the residual claimant in the relationship. After "buying" the "franchise," the agent's goals are perfectly aligned with the principal's initial goals. Therefore, the agent always acts as the principal would if she shared the agent's superior information and expertise. In particular, the greater the amount of rainfall, the more diligently the farmer works because the expected "~ormally, k = I B I X I V ( X ) f ( XI e*(8) 
and where g ( 8 ) is the density function for 8. The term involving the double integral is the expected value of the franchise to the principal when the agent always delivers the efficient level of effort, e*(8). Notice that without essential loss of generality, the marginal cost to the agent of each unit of effort has been normalized to unity.
returns from his effo1.t are greater. T h e division of the realized surplus is resolved in the pr.iricipal's favor when the principal niakes a take-it-or-leave-it offel. that the agerit is just lvilling to accept." -This simple resolution of lvhat might, at first blush. appear to be a nontrivial incentive problem relies heavily on sorne special features of this canonical model. .I'hese special feattires are \<hat create fr-ictions in the principal-agetit relationship, atid thus necessitate the use of a broader set of tools arid institutions.
T h e first special feature is the symmetry of precontr;lctual beliefs. If the farmer ant1 landotvner didn't skiat-e the sarrie beliefs about the likely amount of rainfall, for example, they night not agree on the value of the right t o farm the lancl, rendering the neat separation of incentive issues (motivating the agerit to choose an efficient level of effort) and tlistributiori issues (how the surplus is divided) problematic.' Implicit in the strong ass~k~nptior~ of symmetric beliefs is the presumption that both parties are able to anticipate firily all possible contingencies that might arise during their-relatio~isliip.~
T h e second special feature is the presumed risk neutrality of the agent. Notice that under the identified contract, the farmer bears a11 the risk associated witti ttie randoni rainfall and with any inherent randomr~ess in the production process. In general, whenever a n agent is averse to risk, sorrle sharing of the risk between prirlcipal and agent will be optimal. For exarnple, a risk-averse farmer shouldn't be forced to bear the entir-e burden of a poor. harvest wlieri the weather turns out to be unusually bad.
T h e third special feature of this simplest of settings is the assurnptiori that the agent can be bound costlessly to carry out the terrns of all)-contract he agrees to. In particular, even though the agent may know ~z h e n he observes a n unf~~vorable ellvironment (that is, a low 0 indicating little r.ainfall i11 the tenant farnier interpretation) that the best he can possibly d o is earn an expected net return far below his reservation utility level, the agent is unable to abrogate or renegotiate the contract h e has signed. In a sense, the agent's co~nlnitrnent ability is perfect in this setting. So, too, is the principal's commitment ability. T h e pa!-ment schedule announced by the principal cannot he changed afier the output is observed. This fact assures that the agerit tvill riot be "helci up" b?-the principal after. (costly) effort has been exerted. In practice, a worker's coniniitnlent abilities are not perfect. Labor laws prohibit slavery, so an enlployee can't "111 nlo,t of this literature, it is assumed that \vlie~i the agent is i~ltlifftr-eiit .Itnorig actiorls, like brt\\ten .~cccl,ti~ig oi-I-rjcctirlg the (ontl-at t , the agelit will cl~oost. the action ino\t pr-cltr-I-etl Ijy tile p r i~i c~p ,~l .
I'his rnrthod of "t)rrakilig ties" I-rsolvcs ;I techtllcal open-set prohiern of lirnited ec olionnc I I I~C I e\t. ' hertlcc t h ,~t as prrco~irr;~ctu;il ;I> l o t~g beliefs a r c s)-n11nct1-ic, the fi-anchise conti-act rn;ixiini~rs total s r~r p l~~s not e n t l o~r t l tlith all of t h r t)argai~ling powel-. B,11-#;1ining coultl c\crl if the princip;~l i\ ser-vt. to d i \ i d e tlic sui-plus b e t~e e i i priilcip;~l arltl agetlt. 'see \\'illi;~~nsor(1'355, 1'3853, for-ex:lniplc, for-n detailed discussio~l of the practic;~l tliificultirs that r~i -~s c \\hen i t is costl\ f i~r p,~r-tics to ;I contract t o accorlrit fol-all c.oiit~~~grric~ea that cor~lti possil~lv ;~r i \ t .
;\tlti~tioii,~l i%\ue are p r e \ e~~t c t l thc c o i i c l u d i~~g thoughts o n t h~s i l l sc,ction. credibly promise to serve his employer forever. T h e commitment ability of a principal is often limited in practice too. Politicians routinely break campaign pledges, and downturns in the economy often force employers to implement unanticipated layoffs or wage cuts.
The fourth special feature is the presumption that the agent's performance is publicly observable. T h e initial contract can be readily enforced when performance under the contract is costlessly verified by both the principal and agent and, if necessary, an impartial enforcement agency (like a court). In practice, though, it will often be difficult to measure performance precisely. T o illustrate, the number of ears of corn delivered by the farmer may be easily counted, but the sweetness of the corn or the water content of the kernels may be more difficult to measure exactly.
Notice that in this simplest of settings, since all contracting frictions can be avoided costlessly with the identified franchise contract, the principal would never pay to obtain information about the working environment or the magnitude of the agent's efforts. However, when frictions are caused by precontractual asymmetries of information, risk aversion, limited commitment abilities, or problems in measuring the agent's performance, the principal generally will benefit from an improved ability to monitor the agent's effort and/or working environment. T h e optimal use of such monitors will be discussed shortly.
Extensions of the Canonical Setting
Let us consider the implications of relaxing the strong assumptions that eliminate all frictions in the canonical model. First, suppose the agent is averse to risk. In this case, if the agent were asked to bear all the risk associated with production, he would require an expected payment in excess of v.To conserve on the risk premium she must award the agent for bearing risk, the principal will choose to bear some risk herself. Loosely speaking, this means that although the agent generally receives greater compensation the higher his realized performance, the agent's incremental reward for additional performance will generally be less than the value to the principal of that additional performance. In this sense, the agent is no longer the sole residual claimant in the relationship, as under the franchising contract.
This fact implies that the agent's goals are no longer perfectly aligned with the principal's initial goals. In particular, since the agent no longer benefits as much from outstanding performance, his incentives to supply effort are dimini~h e d .R isk sharing between principal and agent can also act as a form of insurance for the agent. When he is effectively insured against bad outcomes or details of a formal model along these lines, see for example Stiglitz (1974 Stiglitz ( , 1975a , Harris and under the optimal contract, the agent will exert less effort to avoid these bad outcomes. To illustrate, after a homeowner purchases theft insurance, he may be less careful about locking his doors at night.'' A similar effect arises when the agent's commitment ability is limited. To illustrate, suppose the tenant farmer is always free to terminate his relationship with the landlord without penalty after observing the amount of rain that has fallen. Alternatively, when a corporation's revenues turn out to be below costs, the firm can declare bankruptcy and suspend payments to creditors. The force of such arrangements can be to ensure that after becoming informed about the environment, the agent never expects to receive less than his reservation utility level, U.
In contrast, under the franchise contract, the uninformed agent only expects to earn his reservation utility on average. When the working environment turns out to be less favorable than expected (that is, when lower values of 8 are realized), the agent will be worse off than if he had never signed a contract with the principal. Therefore, if the principal offered the franchise contract described above in an environment where the agent's maximum loss or his "liability" is limited by his right to rescind his contractual obligations, the agent would exert effort and remain in the principal's employ only for the higher realizations of 8; and in those more productive states, the agent would receive the entire value of his performance.
When the principal must respect the agent's right to abrogate the terms of the original contract, the principal will find it advantageous to alter the terms of the contract she offers to the agent. In particular, the optimal contract will generally induce performance by the agent even for the less favorable realizations of the environment. But this expanded performance will not be induced simply by lowering the franchise fee ( k ) . To do so would grant too much of the total available surplus to the agent, raising the agent's expected utility above U so that he receives rents. Instead, the principal will implement a sharing of the total realized surplus. By promising the agent a fraction of the full value of his performance, the agent can be induced to deliver productive effort, albeit less than the efficient level of effort. Consequently, limited liability restrictions, like risk aversion on the part of the agent, result in contracts that induce too little effort from the agent."
The principal faces the same qualitative tradeoffs when the agent's initial information about the productive environment is superior to the principal's own information as she does when the agent is protected by limited liability covenants. T o see the connection, suppose once again that the landlord offered the basic franchise contract to a farmer who, because of past experience, has very accurate information about how much rainfall will occur that year. The farmer would reject the franchise contract when he felt certain that little rainfall ' O~h e s e moral hazard problems have been afforded considerable attention in the insurance literature (Pauly, 1974; Arnott and Stiglitz, 1989) . I I For the formal details of models in which limited liability restrictions are featured, see for example Kahn and Scheinkman (1985) or Sappington (1983).
\vould occ.ur (since accepting ivould entail earning less that1 ( ' in expected utilit!.). -1 -h~ far~rier-t\.oulci accept tlie contract only when he was co~lfident of higher le\,els of r:iirif:lll, exactly as lie \voulti \\.hen he is protectetl by limited liability clauses but discovers the level of rainfall only after signing the contract.
Anticipating this I)cli;i\-ior, the lalidlord ivill agai11 nodi if) the coritriicr by inclucitig soiiie ef1i)rt fronl the firmer even for the lower levels of r-ainfiill, ~\ i t h o~~t the 1;11-11ie1-of' the realized surplus. Again, this is accomg~. ; i~i t i~l g :ill plisheti t)y sharing the re:~li/ed returns with tlie farmer.
71'h~~s, t.hether risk aversion, lirriited liability restr-ictioris or asyrrirrietric precolitl.actu:il ilifi)~.lrlation co~nplicate the canonical ~riodel pl.ese~ited earlier, silliil;ir qualitati\.e efkcts emerge. .l'he ~riost important effect is that a fi-arichise ColitI-ilCt i~riposes too I~I L I Crisk 011 the agent o r delivers too great a share of the re;ili~ed s~~r p l u s resorts contract. to him, a n d so the principal to a "sharing" 13ec:iuse the iigent's c o m p e~i s a t i o~~ to his per-fortrl;irice under the is less sensiti~e s11:u.ilig ;i~-r~ingernerit tliari 111icler the fi-anchise contract, the agent exerts less efl01.t unclei. the fi)rnier contl-act. 71'liis r e d~~c e t l efIi1r.t results in losses for the pri~icipal rel:~tive to the benchmark setti~lg of' the canonical model. Ze\ertlieless, the sh:iritig contract is advantageous to the principal because it ilitlucei; the agent to tailor his effort level to the envi~,onrnent. \$'hen highelle\.rls of' infill fill increase tlie prod~icti\-ity of' the tenillit tar~ncr's labor, the fi~l-tiier \\.ill rvork harder ~t l i d e r a sharing contract \\.heti 1not-e 1.ai11 has f,illen.
T h e gains i l l total surplus that arise from ;i(l,j~~sting the farnier's labor input ac.c.o~.ditig to itts p~.ocluctivity :ire di\idcd 1)etwcen prilic.ipal atid agent under 21 s l~;~r i~i g col~tr;ict. .I'lte eu;ict deti~ils of the optitrial sh;iring :lIxingerneiit a n d tlie nn~riber of distinct colltl.acts the pl.incipal of1t.1-s ~v i l l tlcpend o n ;I nutiibrr-of' factors, iticluditig the 11atut.c of' the agent's preco~it~.actui~l ;itid 1) hether he i~ifi)rlii:itio~~ stibseclnently :icquil.rs better infortriation. -1' 0 illustrate, \rlppose that at the time ;I (.ontract is signeti, the tellant f;tr~iie~. h;1s t~etter knowledge than the la~itllord bout likelv l,ai~if;ill, but the hrrner's i~iIOrliiation doesn't provide 21 pel-fect \\-c.;tthe~. ti){-ecast. Oiily at :I later date, ,just before the tatmer has to clecide how ha1.d to ~o 1 . k at harvesting the crop, does tlie firmel-leal-11 the exact aniourlt of r;ii~lfiill. 111 this settilip, the landlord can g i r l by offering the hirmer :I choice :ilnolig slia~.ing colltr:~cts, or ecluivitle~itly (I\Iyersoti, 1979) , by solicitilig a ue;ither-101-ecact ti-o111 the fiu.rner t\~liic.h cietel.mines the sh;~ring contr-act that ~v i l l l,e implenielited.
1' 0 sec this, suppose ti)i. siliiplicity that thr. fill.nier initially leal-11s ivhether r.;~iriIiill tvill 1)e above Li\.el.;ige o r t)eloi+ a\,eragr. 01ie nail e strateg! the landlor-d cot~ltl f0llo~v i l l tliis setting rvoulcl he to ask the f'irnicl. to I-eport lvhether he expects t.;~ilif'all to 1)c ;lbo\e 01.belo\\-:i\.et.;ig.e, and the11 design the best sharing corit~.;ict pl.esuliiirig tlie 1i11.11ier's fi)recast to he accul.;lte. I ' h e problem with this ti:ii\.e stl.xteg! is that i t I\ ill ill\$ :iys il~tluce thy f;il.liie~. to prec1ic.t belo\v a\.er.:ige ~.:~iilfall, t o t . a poor hiit-\-est. .I s~~per.ior thcreh!-pl.c.pa~.ing the la~itllol~cl alte1.11a
should commit to implementing a "steeper" or more "high-powered" sharing contract the higher the predicted rainfall. The more high-powered the sharing contract, the more closely does the farmer's compensation correspond to his performance. Thus, under a particularly high-powered contract, the farmer will receive very large payments if abundant rainfall leads to a plentiful harvest. However, the farmer will receive very little payment if the harvest is meager. Consequently, if the farmer truly believes rainfall will be below average, the threat of low payoffs when rainfall turns out to be scarce will dissuade the farmer from exaggerating likely rainfall. Similarly, a false report of below average rainfall is unappealing to the farmer, because the low-powered incentive contract it calls forth limits the farmer's ability to earn large profits when rainfall turns out to be plentiful. In this manner, a principal can solicit truthful reporting of imperfect but superior information from an agent. The agent's report enables the principal to design an incentive scheme that secures greater expected surplus by better tailoring incentives to the environment. Of course, because the agent has unique skills and privileged information, he will generally be able to command a share of this surplus in the form of rents. Therefore, the principal could conceivably gain from additional policy instruments that provide direct (although possibly imperfect) observations of the agent's activities or his information. The optimal use of such monitors is described in the next section.
Monitoring and Competition
In the presence of the aforementioned contracting frictions, other more direct observations of the agent's activities or information may help the principal to motivate the agent. To illustrate, consider the case where the agent is averse to risk, and suppose that an imperfect public signal about the agent's effort level is available. For example, the signal might be the sum of the agent's actual level of effort and the realization of a standard normal random variable. A question of interest is: "When will the principal choose to base the agent's compensation on both the realization of the signal and on the agent's observed performance, rather than simply on the agent's performance?" Conceivably, the principal might choose to ignore the imperfect signal because its use would impose some risk on the risk-averse agent.
It turns out that whenever the signal and the agent's realized performance together provide more information about the agent's effort than does the agent's performance alone, the agent's compensation under the optimal contract will be based on both his performance and on the signal. The added risk imposed on the agent from slight use of the imperfect monitor will be insignificant relative to the incentive benefits achieved." or a careful statement of this conclusion and a formal proof, see Holmstrom (1979) . Also see Harris and Raviv (1979) and Shave11 (1979) .
In practice, monitors take a variety of forms. Hidden cameras and time cards can serve as imperfect monitors of a worker's effort, as can direct observations and "spot checks" by supervisors. The actions and performance of a fellow worker can also serve to discipline a worker. T o illustrate, extend the canonical setting to allow a single principal to devise an incentive scheme for two risk averse agents, agents A and B. Further suppose that these agents work in correlated environments. For example, 0 might reflect rainfall or soil conditions on nearby farms. Plentiful rainfall or favorable soil conditions on one farm might suggest that the same conditions will be found on nearby farms. Formally, this correlation could be captured by assuming the productivity parameters, o A and O B , observed (privately) by agents A and B, respectively, are positively correlated.
The question of interest in this setting is how the principal or landlord can best exploit the correlation across environments to motivate agents or tenant farmers. One way to do so is to link each farmer's incentive contract to the reports received from both farmers about their environment. These reports are obtained simultaneously from the two farmers before they decide how hard to work at harvesting the crop. The natural tendency of a farmer working in isolation would be to understate the likely rainfall because if the landlord could be made to believe that little rainfall is likely, the landlord might not expect so much from the farmer and therefore not penalize him too severely for a poor harvest.
However, if the landlord provides rewards to both farmers when their reports are "consistent" and penalizes the farmer who predicts the least rainfall when the two predictions are sufficiently inconsistent, incentives to underpredict rainfall can be mitigated. In essence, under an incentive scheme of this form, each farmer is asked to assess not only his own environment, but also to report on his fellow farmer's environment. When farmer A , for example, learns that rainfall on his farm is plentiful, he knows that plentiful rainfall is also likely on farmer B's land. Hence, if farmer B is expected to report his rainfall truthfully, farmer A will be less likely to understate the rainfall on his land, for fear of being penalized for reporting an inaccurate assessment of farmer B's environment. Similar arguments explain why farmer B's (Nash) response might also be to understate the rainfall on his land less often than he might otherwise be tempted to do in isolation. By comparing the reports of the farmers, the landlord can reduce the rents the farmers command from their private information.I3
I : 4 A formal model along these lines is analyzed in Deniski and Sappington (1984) . Also see Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983a) . For an analysis o f the setting where the output o f an organization is a joint product o f the effort o f many agents, see Holmstrom (1982) . Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) , Stiglitz (1990) , and Varian (1990) A special concern arises when self-interested actors, rather than inanimate devices, are employed as monitors. The concern is with coordinated play among the actors. For example, farmers A and B could try to thwart the landlord's attempt to make meaningful comparisons between their reports by both always reporting that the smallest possible level of rainfall has occurred. Such strategies could conceivably constitute an equilibrium and improve the expected payoff of both farmers. However, a sufficiently sophisticated landlord can preclude such informal cooperation among the farmers. The method is to single out one of the farmers, say farmer A , and reward him for "squealing" on farmer B whenever B attempts to behave strategically in the manner described above. The reward to farmer A can be structured so that he finds it profitable to "squeal" on farmer B if and only if farmer B is behaving strategically (Ma, 1988; Ma, Moore, and Turnbull, 1988; Mookherjee and Reichelstein, 1990) . Essentially, farmer A is given a large payment if he predicts that farmer B will understate rainfall and farmer B then does report meager rainfall. Farmer A is penalized, though, if after squealing on farmer B, farmer B reports plentiful rainfall. l 4
Thus, additional agents can provide valuable information about the information or activities of any particular agent, just as an inanimate monitor can. Moreover, the presence of multiple agents can be particularly valuable to the principal when the performance of each agent is influenced primarily by a common environmental parameter that the principal cannot observe. In such a setting, the relative performance of the agents can provide a good indicator of their individual efforts, while controlling for the effects of the common environmental shock. Thus, effort can be motivated without imposing excessive risk on the agents.
TO illustrate, suppose each farmer's harvest is influenced to some extent by the soil conditions on his farm, but is determined primarily by the number of insects that eat his crops and by his efforts in combatting the insects. Also suppose that the absentee landlord cannot communicate with the farmers about insect blight, and that the insects affect all farms in similar fashion. In this setting, a simple tournament, in which the farmers are compensated solely according to the ordinal ranking of their harvests, can often provide good incentives for the farmers. Even the simplest of tournaments, where the farmer whose harvest is the largest receives a large payment and all other farmers receive a small payment, can often motivate the farmers better than individualized contracts, wherein each farmer's payment would depend exclusively on the level of his harvest. Tournaments can level the playing field for the agents, effectively controlling for and providing insurance for risk averse agents against 14 The landlord's task would be complicated if farmer B could communicate directly with farmer A and bribe him not to squeal. Formal collusion of this type is addressed in Tirole (1986) . such random events as insect blight that affect all agents in similar fashion and are beyond the agents' control.15
Of course, the ideal incentive scheme will generally be a combination of individualized and relative performance schemes (Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983b) . Furthermore, the best tournament is not always of the winner-take-all variety; it may be better for the principal to penalize the agent with the worst performance rather than reward the agent with the best performance. Implementing such a loser-bear-all tournament is particularly beneficial when relatively little effort is desired from agents, making the optimal prize in a winner-take-all tournament relatively small.16 In such a setting, an agent in a winner-take-all contest with many participants might find it optimal to exert no effort at all, assessing the likely return to his effort to be negligible. However, the same agent could be induced to exert some effort when threatened with a large penalty for finishing last (Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983b) .
Tournaments may be particularly valuable incentive devices when the principal has only a limited ability to commit. In some situations, the performance of an agent may be difficult for a third party to observe perfectly. For example, a court might have difficulty discerning the number of broken toasters a hired repairman was actually able to fix. In such a setting, the owner of the repair shop might wish to understate the repairman's performance and therefore pay him less than he is due under the contract he signed. Tournaments mitigate this incentive to some extent because with a tournament, -payments need not be based on cardinal measures of performance. By simply requiring a payment of fixed size to the "winning" agent regardless of the magnitude of that agent's performance, a tournament provides less opportunity for the principal to renege on payments after the fact (Malcomson, 1986) .
Finally, it should be noted that the linking of tasks is another way of providing a monitor of the agent's activities. T o illustrate, suppose the agent is a risk-neutral developer of a mechanical device and the principal's task is to procure the device at minimum cost. Also suppose the developer has private I 5~o illustrate this comparison somewhat more formally, consider the setting described in the previous section, but now with n risk averse agents. Suppose the performance (X,) of agent i is related to his effort (e,) by the relationship X, = Be, + A,. Thus, the productivity parameter, 0, represents a common shock to the productivity of each agent, while A , represents an additional independent shock to (only) the particular performance of agent z. In this setting, a principal will choose to implement a tournament rather than to design individualized compensation schemes for the n agents if B is sufficiently important relative to all A,. See Green and Stokey (19831, Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983a, b) for more details of this and related arguments. Some early work that explores the merits and drawbacks of piece-rate compensation and relative performance schemes is found in Stiglitz (1975a) . knowledge of the cost of perfecting the prototype. Further suppose there is a second task, maintenance of the ~nechanical device, that rnight be performed either by the developer or by the buyer of the device. For simplicity, assume the developer and buyer are equally capable of performing the maintenance task, but neither learns the exact cost of maintenance until after development of the prototype is conlpleted. Most importantly, the cost of niainterlance is correlated with the cost of developnlent. l h e question of interest here is whether the buyer sl-iould assign both the development and nlaintenance tasks to the developer or perform the maintenance herself.
The answer to this question depends critically on how costs are correlated across the two tasks. If the two costs are negatively correlated, the buyer will gain by assigning both tasks to the developer. T h e gain stems from the "countervailing incentive" introduced by linking the two stages of production. Ll'hen asked to perforni only the first task, the developer's incentive will be to exaggerate his costs of doing so. 1,t'hen the developer knows that he will also perform the maintenance task, however, a countervailing consideration is introduced. S o w when the developer reports that the costs of developrnent are high, he implicitly claims that he expects maintenance costs to be low. Such a claim can be tied to an obligation to per-form the maintenance task in return for relatively rneager compensation. I'his obligation limits the developer's incentive to exaggerate development costs."
Corresponding countervailing incentives d o not arise when the costs of the two tasks are positively correlated. 111 this case, exaggeratilig the costs of developrnent also amounts to a prediction that maintenance costs will be high. Consequently, the developer's incentive to misrepresent the costs of development is enhanced by assigning both tasks to the developer. In this case, the buyer optimally perfornls the nlaintenance task herself (Riordan and Sappington, 198%) .
Agent Selection
T o this point, the agent or set of agents with whorl1 the principal deals has been taken as given. But often, an important conlponent o f t h e principal's task is to select thc "best" agent or agents. T h e procurer of a n item wants to select the least-cost supplier: banks seek to identib the rnost reliable loan applicants.
Requiring potential agents to bid for the right to serve as the agent is one Inearls by which the principal can identify the best agent, while sinlultaneously limiting his rents. T o illustrate this possibility, consider the procurement setting .A rel'rted courltervailing i r l c entive :ir-ise~ in Stiglitz a n d \Volfson (1988) . .I'here, a fir-111's illcelrti\e is to ~~~l d e r s t :~t e it5 itlcotllc to the IKS to limit tax lial)ilitie, t~u t to ovet-state its incorrlc to poterltial irl\esto~-s to illcrc.isc its stock. n~a r l e r \ d u e . Fol-rrlor-e or1 coulltervailillg incentives, scc l.e\\is <~n d S,ipl~ingtoli (1989a. 11). where potential producers have (independent) imperfect private knowledge of their likely pl.octuction costs. Also suppose the procurer or buyer wishes to select a sirlgle firrn to serve as the sole producer of a commodity, like electricity. Standard auction theory suggests that with a second-price auction, for example, potential protfucers can be induced to bid their true valuations of the franchise (Milgrom and IVeber, 1982; McAfee and McMillan, 1987a) . Thus, by awarding the sole right to produce to the highest bidder in return for a payment equal to the bid of the second-highest bidder, the buyer can be sure to select the producer with the lowest expected costs. Furthermore, the buyer will extract all rents from the selected producer, except for the difkrence between that producer's valuation of the franchise and the valuation of the second-highest bidder.
T h e auctioning of a franchise departs from standard auctions in that a producer's valuation of the franchise can be controlled to some extent by the buyer because the buyer can link the colnpensation rules under the franchise to the winning bid. Doing so enhances the buyer's ability to extract rents frorri the selected producer. One niight interpret the optilnal linking in the following manner. T h e buyer can indicate to potential producers that a low winning bid will be interpreted as a prediction that protiuction costs are likely to be high. Therefore, to protect the winning bidder against the prospect of high cost realizations, a prospect irriplicitly deemed to be likely by the bidder, pronounced cost-sharing will be implemented. Under low-powered incentive schemes with pronounced cost-sharing, the producer realizes relatively little profit if costs ultilnately turn out to be low. Thus, the attl.action to a bidder of shading his bid is reduced. To further limit incentives to shade bids, the buyer can promise to implement a high-powered incentive scheme which involves only limited cost-sharing \$.hen the winning bid is high. Under high-powered incentive schernes, the producer's profit rises steeply as realized costs fall, making such schemes relatively attractive to producers who expect their costs to be low. Intuitively, what the buyer is doing in this litlking procedure is modifying the object being auctioned-the production co~ltract-accordi~lg to the winning bid. Such modification promotes more aggressive bidding because it renders more similar the likely gains of diverse bidders. In essence, this linking is a form of handicapping that enhances cornpetition."
Much like bidding cornpetition before the contract is granted, the threat of colnpetitiori after the contract is granted can also serve to ttiscipline an agent. I\ firm such as a local cable television operator that faces no potential competition once it is selected to serve an area may have a strong incentive to pad or exaggerate production costs or to reduce the quality of its services. l h e s e incentives may be mitigated to some extent if an alternative producer is available who could replace the incun~berit producer. Optimal use of the alternative supplier involves calling upon his services when the actual or predicted pe~,formance of the incumbent is particularly poor (Demski et al., 1987; Nalebuff' and Stiglitz, 1983a) .
IZecause of the disciplinary role an alternative supplier can play, it niay often be valuable for the principal to keep an alternative source available. Indeed, the Packard Chrnnlission report (U.S. (;overnrnent, 1986) advises the I,..S. L>epartment of Deferisc to expand the use of second sourcing in military procurement. However, the varietl-of costs associated with maintaining an alternative source can be prohibitive. .lside from the direct expense of duplicative assets, an alternative production source can introduce undesirable incentive costs. In particular, if' an incumbent fears forfeiting the franchise he currentl!. operates, the illcumbent will be reluctant to invest resources that iniprove filture rather than current performance. For exarnple, an incumbent public utility that produces electricity might be able to streanlline its operations and improve long-run service to customers through diligent effort. However, if the firm knows that its tenure in the industry is limited, it will have lirnited incentive to provide the requisite effort unless it can secure immediate compensation for its efTorts from the regnlator. Such compensatiori is often problematic 1,ecause effort is inherently difticult to rnoriitor. I'Vhen these long-term irivestnient effects are significant relative to the discipline an alternatiw supplier can pr-ovide, the principal may prefer to limit the use of a second source."' 1'1-oper selection of the niost desirable agents can require subtle balancing of the policy instruments used to attract thcrn. 71' o illustrate, consider-the case of a hank seeking to loan filnds only to those agents with the best projects. T h e bank cannot assess the risk associated with each agent's project perfectly, iilthough all pl-ojects are known to have the same expected return. Agents are assumed to Iiave no wealth of their ow11, and to be protected by bankruptcy constraints. 'l'llerefbre, if a n agent's project fails, that agent cannot be forced to repay the loan to the bank.
7.0 limit the rents that accrue to agents, the bank will want to set a high interest rate, which will ensure generous returns for the bank f r o n~ successful projects. However, too high an interest rate can be detrimental for the bank. Il'hen bankruptcy laws provide insurance against the downside risk, high intel.est rates may not discourage borrowers with very risky projects as much as they discourage agents with less risky projects. This is because agents with very risky projects realize there is a smaller chance they will ever have to repa)-the high interest rate, since their probability of iailure is greater. T h e net result o f a higher interest rate can therefore be a smaller expected return for the bank. Consequently, a bank may prefer to ration its loans rather than raise the !I L.afYont ,tntl Tirole (19S8b) a r i a l~~c . a n incunlbrnt pl.oducel. is optitriall) fa\or-ed irr hitfcling tit)\< 1 0 1 . thc ~.ight to \c.t.\c ;is a moriopol) [)I-oducer-. I interest rate it charges when there is excess dernand for loans at the prevailing interest rate."'
Dynamic Interaction
In many situations, the relation between principal and agent \.\.ill be ongoing, and this fact can be valuable for the principal. Rcnieniber that i11 the rnoclels presented earlier, incentive problems arise hecause the effort supplied by the risk-averse agent cannot be observcd by the principal. However, these problenls can essentially be avoided in sonie dynaniic settings.
In particnlar, suppose the relation between effort arid performance is the same in each period. Also suppose there is n o discounting, so both the principal and agent value future profit as highly as they d o current profit and their relationship is certain to continue into the indefinite future. T h e n if the agency relationship is repeated a sufficiently large number of times, the prirlcipal's most preferred outcome can be approxiniated arbitrarily closely. l h e agent can be induced to put forth the level of effort the principal prefers in each period, ~vhile imposing virtually no risk on the agent, by conlpensating the agent on the basis of average performance. With a sufficiently large number of repetitions, randomness in average performance beconies negligible if the agent puts forth the desired level of effort in each period. l h u s , by promising to ensure the agent his reservation utility if and only if his average performaricc is sufkiently close to the announced target over time, the principal can secure the desired behavior fronl an agent without imposing arly risk on the ager~t."
When future payoffs are discounted and/or when the duration of the agency relationship is nlore limited, the principal's ideal orltconle can no longer be ensured. I n such settings, the conflict between risk sharing and inceritive effects re-enicrges. Nevertheless, gains generally arise frorri basing an agent's 20 Cvrrespondirig conclusions holti when agents appear ident~cal, but I i a~e discr-etiotr oter the pr-ojects the) i~ridertake. I n this setting, a higher interest rare can indutc l)ot-l-o~\.er\ ro uridcrtake mot-e risky projects, 21s they airn f;)r the "t~ig payofls" t h~t atll leate thern \+ith , I pt-ofit after I-epaying the high loan charges. Sec Stiglit~ and LVeiss (1981) for an anal\sis of both interpretations. Similar logic applies in the corresponding dlnamic settlng where agents ;tppear ~d e n t~c a l , but have discretion ovet. the projects the) undertake. Kather than charge an intfividual \vl~ose previous project failed a higher interest rate for an additional loan, the bank may pr-efet-to terminate cr-edit. LVhile the thr-eat of having to pay a highel-interest r-ate on futtir-e loans can help discipline the current behavior of a borrorver-, thc threat of cutting olf'credit can provide even greater-diwipline, while avoiding thc temptation high interest rates prov~de to borrowers to tindertake more risk) projects. Stiglit~ and LVeiss (1983) olTcr a formal analysis of this issue. 2 1 For the formal details of this argument, see Kadner (1981 Kadner ( , 1985 arid Kitbinstein and Ymri (1983) . In essence, the principal serves as a "bank" here, providing loans to the agent in bad periods, and accepting repayments ot the loan in good pe~iods. LVhen the agent ha\ indepentient access to credit, $0 the principal's role as banker is eliminated, the gains fi-on1 long term contracts can be less pronottnced. See Fudenberg, Holmstroru and \filgr-oin (1990) and rstava (1 987). compensation in each period on his past performance as well as his future performance. For example, a poor harvest by the farmer in one year can be forgiven to some extent if the harvest is particularly good in preceding or succeeding years. In this manner, the landlord can insure the farmer, albeit imperfectly, against such random elements as rainfall and pestilence without eliminating the farmer's incentive to labor diligently (Arnott and Stiglitz, 1989; Lambert, 1983; Rogerson, 1985; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983) .
When the interaction between principal and agent is repeated, the friction caused by the principal's limited intertemporal commitment becomes important. T o illustrate this friction, suppose the productive environment (soil quality, for example) is the same each year, and is known to the farmer at the outset of his repeated relationship with the landlord. For simplicity, also suppose the amount of crop produced is a deterministic function of the farmer's effort and the quality of his soil. In this setting, the farmer will realize that if the landlord ever infers the true soil quality, the principal will be in a position to extract all rents from the farmer from that point in time onward. Recognizing this fact, the farmer will be very reluctant to ever let his performance reveal the true soil quality. Consequently, the landlord may be completely unable to induce the farmer to use his superior information to their mutual advantage. T h e farmer may be asked simply to produce the same minimal harvest regardless of the soil quality, thereby ensuring the landlord can't infer anything about the soil from the realized harvest." Incentive problems of this type are common in centrally-planned economies where the government employs past performance to set future goals. Realizing that superior performance will be rewarded by "ratcheting up" future targets, producers have limited incentive to perform u p to their potential. This ratchet effect is alleviated to some extent if the productive environment varies randomly over time. When current conditions are not a perfect indicator of future conditions, the agent can retain access to relevant privileged information and the associated rents even when his present performance allows a perfect inference of the conditions under which he labors. Thus, it may be less costly for the principal to induce the agent to tailor his performance to the environment when the environment changes over time.
In addition, a principal could conceivably gain from intentionally introducing randomness into the productive environment. For example, a principal may realize gains from constantly assigning workers to new tasks. A worker who knows he can escape the higher performance standards his superior performance will ultimately bring to bear will be less reluctant to work diligently in his present task.
There are also dynamic settings in which agents will be reluctant to have their performance observed by others even when the agents have no private ?'The works of Aron (1987) , Baron and Besanko (1987), Freixas, Guesnerie and Laffont (1985) , Laffont and l'irole (1988a), Sappington (1986) , Stiglitz (1975a) and LVeitzman (1980) are just a few of the many dynamic agency models where the principal's commitment powers are limited.
information about the environment o r their personal abilities. T h e basic reason is that an agent's performance may reveal new illformation about his innate ability, ~i h i c h makes his future compensation more risky than it otherxiisc would be (Stiglit~, 1975h, 1982 . 'l'obe concrete, suppose agents arc managers in firms, charged ~i i t h identifying and carrying out attractive investment projccts. Each niallager is risk aver-se and, like his present i111d poter~tial futu1.e employers, uncertain of his innate ability. X manager's performance on a g, ' r~v e n project thus provides i~l f b r n~a t i o~l to himself anel to the market. l'herefore, if competition among potential employers drives a manager's wage to equal his 11erceived marginal product, undertaking a project becon~es risky for the manager. Consequently, even if the manager has no aversion to the effort required to iclentify and carry out investment pro,jects, he will have sosrle aversion to unticrtaking projects that are in his firm's best interest (Ilolmstroni and Kicart i Costa, 1986) . A partial remcciy for this problcm might involve it firm ulldertakillg measures to liniit the ability of other firnis to observe the performance of its managers (Gibbons, 1986) . 111 this lvay, insurance may be proviclecl to the manager by making his wage less sensitive to his performance.
Conclusions and Future Directions
I'he intent of this article was to review some of the insights derived in the broad ancl grotving literature o n incentives. In this conclutling section, some brief observations are offered co~lcel-ning a few of the many issues that received inadequate mention here.
Foremost among these issues are the concepts of "bouncled ratioli:ility" and "incomplete contracting" (Sinion, 1951; \Villiamson, 1975 \Villiamson, , 1985 . In most of the analyses discusset1 above, the principal and agent tiere omniscient in arl important sense. tllthoi~gh they rnay have been urlaware at various points in their I-el;ttionsl~ij) of the exact "state of nature" ( 8 ) that prevailed, they ryere alriays alial-e of every state that could conceivably occur, and of the relative frequencies of all states. Furthermore, tlie various actors were often assumecl able to communicate their assessment of the envirorlment costlessl~.. In particrilar, all of their kno~iletlge and expertise could be accurately conveyed in 21 simple message. In practice, of course, communicating one's knowledge and ~vriting complete, cletailed contracts are costly activities; sometimes prohibitively costly. T h e question that arises, then, is how best to model the costs of identifying and delineating contingencies that are most important t o incl~tcle in incentive contracts.
T h e most popular approach to date has been an extreme one, \\.herein certain contingencies are assunictf prohibitively costly to specify in advance.":' ?3 One attempt to tnodel the cost5 of w~i t i n g more complicateti contracts e x p l i c~t l IS Dye (1983) . .Use \er Rlc;\fee anti hIc Rfillari ( 1 988).
An incentive contract, therefore, includes a specification of "residual rights of control," specifying which party will have the authority to make critical decisions when unforeseen or previously unspecified contingencies arise (Grossman and Hart, 1986) . The assignment of such rights can have important implications for the performance and value of the agency relationship.24
Another issue of great practical importance that has not been addressed concerns the design of incentive contracts when the principal's information is initially superior to the agent's information. For example, an employer may know more about the hazards involved in performing a particular task than any potential agent or employee. The particular complication that arises in this setting is that by the very nature of the incentive contract the principal offers, she may reveal some or all of her information. In some instances, the principal may wish to share her privileged information with the agent; for example, when the chemical the agent will be working with poses no health risk. In other instances, such as when the chemical is toxic, the principal may prefer that her information remain private.25
A related issue arises when the principal receives information about the agent's activities or performance that is not verifiable, meaning that a third partly (like a court) cannot directly confirm or contradict the principal's observation. To illustrate, a supervisor may know precisely how hard an employee has worked, but be unable to prove her assessment beyond a reasonable doubt. In such settings, it may or may not be possible to make use of the principal's information in an incentive contract. For the unverifiable information to be useful, it must be possible to induce the principal to reveal the information truthfully. For example, if a principal simply receives a fixed bonus every time she reports a worker has shirked, she will be tempted to always make such a report, regardless of the worker's true expenditure of effort. Consequently, the report of a principal in such a situation cannot usefully motivate the worker. On the other hand, if the supervisor: (1) receives a bonus when she identifies a worker who has shirked and overall performance by that worker's unit ultimately turns to be substandard; but (2) incurs a penalty when the performance of the identified shirker's group is exceptionally good, then it may be possible to employ the superior's unverifiable information to motivate the workers.
The foregoing discussion was kept simple by assuming a well-defined role for each actor as either a principal (who designed incentive schemes) or an agent (who largely followed orders). In practice, these roles may be less clearly 2 4~e e the informative discussion of this issue in Holmstrom and Tirole (1988) . Also see Milgrom u (1988) for a discussion of how, in the absence of complete contracting, individuals may have incentives to lobby for "influence" or special treatment when unforeseen contingencies arise. Also see Hart and Moore (1988) . 25~eminal theoretical work on this issue includes Myerson (1983) and Maskin and Tirole (1988, 1990) . Reinganum (1988) examines a setting where a prosecutor may reveal the strength of her case against a defendant in the settlement she proposes. defined. When there are hierarchies of cont~.ol, a n actol-may simulta~ieously he an "agent" of some "princip;ils" and the principal to sonle other agents."":or example, elected officials may serve both as the agents of their constituellts and :-ls principals to their appointees. Similarly, a vice-presidetit ill a corporation may fi~nctior~ ;IS a n agent of the firm's president and as 21 principal to the division managers under his o r her corltrol. F~~r t l~c s n i o r e , in sorne inst;iricrs ;I 11rlrnbc1-of 111-i~icipals may influence the activities of olic 01-Inore agents." To illustrate, riiunicipal, state, and federal officials all have sonic control over the activities of individual citizens. T h e precise mannet-in hich rriultiple principals interact is important to a conlplete ~~nderstandinl:in of' institutions.
For the most part, the incentive literature has depicted the actors in agency rnodels :is self-interested i~idividuals, often with the goal of niaximi7ing net inconic. 3'his approach rria!. captur-e incentive problenis niost sirnpl!-anti starkl!., but it avoids such is\ues as worker lo).;ilty and pride ~vhich ciiti be c~.itical to a firni's success, and are cliscusiecl in Si~ilon's insightful c o~i t r i b~~t i o n to this s).rnposiurn.
I h r intentr\e I~t e~a t u r e h,ic also tended to focus or1 rsol'ited, ~ndepencient dge11~1 reldtro1ljhtp4, T\ hlc h pr ecludcs ,I con~plete rlndel st'ind~ng of complex org,u~~z,it~ons lrke ~I I rns and go\ernriients Nc\er theless, thrre , iẽ Ins~g h t \ concernrrig the optrni,il d e s~g n of or g'inr7'it10ns t h~t cnn be dr,i\z 11fr orti irrnple ,igenc\ rnodeli ' 1' 0 illustrate, the conlrnon practice of cornpensating top corporate eseculives it1 p u t with their compari!,'s stock and stock options is reaclily expl:iinetl. Stocks and stock options help align the incentives of'executives and shareholders by making their pa),offs coincide more closely. Furthcrrnorc, the firni's stock price serves as a convenient ;ind iriexpcnsi\e nio~titor of thc executives' performance, Direct monitoring and evaluation of the daily activities of an executive is problematic giver1 the complex nature of activities an executive perfornls. 'l'he salar-y cornporient of executives' compensatio~l can provide irlsurance against market fi~rccs beyond their contl.ol.
I'romotion within an organization car1 also niotivate en~plo),ees. Promotiorl might best be vietz,ed as a tournament \\.herein :I large prize is a\vardetl to the best performer. Thus, it nlay be eflicient to pay a top executive more than her rnarginal j~rodrlct if hopes of promotion to this lucrative position motivate rrl~inagel-s of lor\.er r:irik tvithirl the firm (Laze:ir and Koserl, 1981) . T h e threat of tlisrlrissal can also ciiscipline wol-ket-s in a firm. Sotice that the ef1ic:tcy of'the disnlissal threiit ill depend upon the loss a \\,ol.ker suf-fe~.s \\hen h e is dismissed. If a n ernployec who is ctismissed can immediately obtain a ne~v,job wit11 cornparable pay, the threat of termination m;iy clo littlc to rnotivate the enn-~)loyee to ~v o r k cliligently o n the job. Consequently, fir-nls ancl society may ?6 Formal ;ir~;il>\cs of hrcr-archic;il ~-r l~~t i o r l s l l i p~ ~rltliide t110\c ol' (;nlvo a n d \.\'ellis/ (11179), -1'irole (1 IlS(i), a n d 1)clnalii ;~ncl Sappingtot) ( 1 W7). 2 7 Formal arl:il\srs ot this issue ar-t, offi,rcd in H;ir.on (198.5), Her-rlf~c~nl (l9S.i, l!ISfi), and \ \ ' l~i r l s t o~~ I3ra~errrran allti Stiglit/ (l!l82), and Stiglitl tl98,i).
benefit from involuntary unemployment to the extent that it lowers the expected utility of workers who are terminated (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) .
Certainly, simple principal-agent models by themselves do not provide a complete understanding of the structure and operation of complex organizations. The models do seem helpful, though, both in identifying some possible sources of friction within organizations and in exploring efficient ways to mitigate these frictions.
